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This paper aims to look at the relationship between capital account openness 
and inflation in the 1990s. It argues that widespread capital account liberalization 
during the early 1990s appears to have contributed to the world-wide disinflation 
observed during that decade. The paper attempts to provide a theoretical and 
empirical evidence for a strong negative link between capital account 
liberalization and disinflation. Capital account openness appears to discipline 
monetary authorities, or to help them convince the private sector that they will be 




JEL Classification: F36, F41, E32 
Keywords: Capital Account, Openness and Inflation 
 
                                                 
∗ Department of Economics, University of California at Santa Cruz. The author can be contacted at 
abhijit@cats.ucsc.edu  
I would like to thank Prof Kenneth Kletzer and Prof Carl Walsh for their helpful comments. I would also 
like to thank Menzie Chinn and Hiro Ito for providing me with their index on capital account liberalization.  
This research was supported from the grants from the Graduate Studies Division of the University of 
California at Santa Cruz. Any opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations expressed in this 
publication are those of the author.  





  In the past decade the world observed two distinct international economic trends. 
Firstly, there was global disinflation with inflation rates falling rapidly even in countries, 
which had a history of high inflation like some Latin American countries. Secondly, 
several countries liberalized their capital account despite warnings of the risks of 
currency and banking crises. There have been several studies to verify whether these 
two developments are related.  
 
 
Literature Review  
Bartolini and Drazen (1997) argue that by liberalizing the capital account 
governments boost foreign and domestic investor confidence. On the other hand capital 
account liberalization directly raises the penalty for loose monetary policy. Easier access 
to foreign exchange raises the elasticity of demand for money and makes the Central 
Bank vulnerable to rapid reserve losses. In a flexible exchange regime, loss of reserves 
is not that important, but rapid currency depreciations can be inflationary. By raising the 
penalties for excess money creation, the Central Bank can alter private sector 
expectations regarding future monetary policy. The temptation to print money is reduced 
and the time consistent inflation rate falls as in the well-known model of Barro and 
Gordon (1983). 
 
One of the factors that influences the extent of capital account liberalization is the 
degree of independence the Central Bank enjoys. Following Grilli, Masciandaro and 
Tabellini (1991), the overall independence of the Central Bank can be divided into two 
types. The first one is political independence (CBPN), which refers to the appointment 
procedure and the duration in office of the government body of the Central Bank. The 
less control the government has over the appointment procedure and composition of the 
board, and longer is the duration of the Central Bank officials, the greater is the political 
independence. On the other hand, economic independence (CBEN) refers to the 
obligations of the Central Bank regarding the financing of the budget deficit through 
money creation and/or interest rate manipulation. The freer is the Central Bank from this 
point of view the greater is the economic independence.  
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Within the sample of countries that they used it was found that capital controls 
were present in 79% of the cases in which the Central Bank had a low degree of political 
independence and in 61% of the cases for high degree of political independence. 
Economic independence appears to be even more important since capital controls were 
present in 79% of the cases of low economic independence but only in 23% of the cases 
of high economic independence.  
 
This might suggest that capital controls are used by governments, who by 
controlling the monetary policy directly can impose a higher levy when capital controls 
are in place. They run regressions by taking inflation as the dependent variable and a 
host of variables including Central Bank independence on the right hand side. The 
coefficient for Central Bank independence turns out to be negative thereby suggesting 
an inverse effect of Central Bank independence on inflation. This along with their earlier 
conjecture implies that capital controls are associated with higher inflation rates. 
However, in this study, the authors only make a conjecture about the relationship 
between Central Bank independence and capital controls. They do not provide any 
empirical or theoretical support to this conjecture. 
  
Another study, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995), look at a panel of 61 developing 
and developed countries. They conclude that restrictions on capital account transactions 
tend to be associated with higher inflation, a higher share of seignorage revenue in total 
revenue, and lower real interest rates. 
 
  Gruben and Mcleod (2001) look at the same sample of countries used by Romer 
(1993) and look at the relationship between capital account openness and inflation. They 
use cross section data and run both OLS and 2SLS with instrumental variables to take 
care of the problem that the choice of imposing capital controls may be endogenous. 
They conclude that capital account openness appears to lower inflation by disciplining 
monetary authorities. They also point out that sustained removal of even one capital or 
current account restriction can reduce average annual inflation by as much as 3%. 
 
  However, the strongest advocates of capital account liberalization recognize that 
liberalization can expose the vulnerabilities of a weak domestic financial system. To the 
extent that capital account liberalization places pressures on weak domestic banks, and 
to the extent that adequate prudential supervision is absent, liberalization can encourage 
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individually rational but socially harmful activities such as excessive risk-taking and 
“gambling for redemption” which can culminate in full-blown and costly banking crises. 
As a result, any benefits of capital account liberalization may easily be obscured by the 
costs of the greater financial fragility it brings, especially in economies with poorly-
regulated financial sectors. More generally, one might expect the benefits of capital 
account liberalization to be more pronounced in countries characterized by a sound 
macroeconomic framework and strong institutions. If this is the case, the lack of strong 
empirical evidence on the benefits of capital account liberalization may simply be due to 
the fact that previous research has not considered the role of policies and institutions in 
intermediating the effects of capital account liberalization on growth or investment.  
 
There have been several studies that have questioned the wisdom of financial 
openness, especially capital account convertibility. Rodrik (1998) undertook a study 
covering 100 countries over the period 1975-89 and looked at the relationship between 
capital account liberalization and three measures of economic performance: per capita 
GDP growth rate, investment as a share of GDP and inflation. He used initial per capita 
GDP, initial secondary enrollment rate, an index of quality of governmental institutions 
and regional dummies for East Asia, Latin America and sub Saharan Africa. The scatter 
plots show that there is no evidence that greater capital account convertibility is 
associated with lower inflation. Rodrik goes on to assert that in fact capital inflows 
undermine Central Bank’s efforts to control inflation.  
 
In another paper McKinnon and Mathieson (1981) argue for imposition of capital 
controls to reduce inflation. They point out that capital controls reduce opportunities of 
currency substitution and hence lower the interest elasticity of demand for domestic 
currency. This in turn reduces the inflation rate that is necessary to generate a given 
amount of seignorage revenue.  Thus we see that both Bartolini and Drazen (1997) and 
McKinnon and Mathieson (1981) use the same argument to reach opposite conclusion. 
Both the papers agree that a decrease in capital controls will increase the elasticity of 
demand for money by increasing opportunities of currency substitution. However, while 
Bartolini and Drazen (1997) argue that this would raise the penalty for loose monetary 
policy and hence enforce a more disciplined monetary policy where the incentive to 
inflate is significantly lowered, McKinnon and Mathieson (1981) argue that it would raise 
the inflation rate required to generate a specific amount of seignorage revenue. 




O’Donnell (2001) looks at 60 countries over the period 1970-94. He uses an 
indicator Cap Vol to measure financial openness. This measure is different from the one 
used in most of the recent literature, which is based on IMF’s Exchange Arrangements 
and Exchange Restrictions. Cap Vol is based on the average of the sum of the stock of 
inward and outward direct investment and the stock of portfolio equity and portfolio debt 
assets and liabilities, as a share of GDP over the period 1971-1994.  
 
O’Donnell regresses the logarithm of the average annual CPI inflation rate and 
the logarithm of the standard deviation of the average annual CPI inflation rate on 
CapVol, using OLS. Certain control variables like the logarithm of initial per capita GDP 
(1971), the logarithm of the initial population level (1971), an index of the quality of 
government institutions, two alternative measures of the degree of Central Bank 
independence, trade openness and regional dummies for East Asia, Latin America, and 
sub-Saharan Africa are introduced to isolate their effect on volatility and the level of 
inflation. Finally five samples are considered: the full sample and four sub samples: non-
OECD and OECD countries, a sub sample excluding countries with average inflation 
rates above 60 percent, and a sub sample excluding OECD countries and those with 
average inflation rates above 60 percent. The paper finds that there is some evidence to 
suggest that increasing financial openness and financial depth increases inflation 
particularly in countries with inflation rates less than 60%. However, overall Cap Vol 
does not affect inflation. 
 
The main drawback with all these papers is that they fail to consider the fact that 
the choice of imposing or restricting capital controls may be endogenous. Firstly, inflation 
levels may influence the policy choice regarding the capital account. One generally 
expects countries to remove capital controls when inflation is reasonably under control. 
Thus, one would expect that any empirical results would be biased in the direction of 
finding a strong positive relationship between open capital accounts and reasonably low 
levels of inflation. Secondly, it may be difficult to accurately assess the benefits of capital 
account liberalization if capital controls are correlated with other fundamental 
determinants of inflation. Grilli and Milesi-Feretti (1995) find that open capital accounts 
are more likely to be found in countries with small public sectors and independent 
Central Banks. These, however, are factors, which may directly impact on inflation, thus 
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making it difficult to isolate the impact of financial liberalization on inflation levels or 
volatility. 
 
Theoretical Framework  
  The government is made up of two branches: a fiscal authority and a monetary 
authority or a Central Bank. The fiscal authority runs an exogenously determined deficit. 
Suppose the Central Bank is entrusted with two functions. The Central Bank issues 
currencies by open market operations in domestic and foreign bonds. The Central Bank 
is also required to monetize a part of the fiscal deficit by buying a steady stream of 
government bonds. However, now the Central Bank has the ability to respond to shocks 
to the economy by altering the policy instrument, which is the level of money supply. 
This would in turn result in higher inflation and higher seignorage revenue. Let 
seignorage revenue be denoted by S, which is a function of inflation. The Central Bank 
is also entrusted with the task of intervening as necessary to defend the exchange rate. 
Thus here we have two contradictory objectives in an open economy. If the Central Bank 
wants to increase seignorage revenue by introducing an inflationary shock it faces a run 
on its reserves or a depreciation of the currency as the public wants to substitute 
domestic currency and hold foreign currency. We assume a quadratic cost of the 





CB WS π ψπ =−          1  
where ψ  is the weight that the Central Bank puts on the costs involved with increasing 
inflation like loss of reserves or depreciation of the currency vis a vis the gains from 
inflation in terms of seignorage revenue.   
  
  Let the demand for money be denoted by a Cagan money demand equation 
where nominal interest rates are dominated by nominal inflation.  
 
          2   ( 1 η + −= − − tt t t mp p p )
  ηµ ⇒=+ tt pm          3  
 
 Hereη is the semi elasticity of the demand for real balances with respect to 
expected inflation whileµ is the constant rate of growth of money supply.  Opening up of 
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the capital account increases this semi elasticity as the public has the freedom to access 
foreign currency. Thus we have  ( ) η ξ which implies that the semi elasticity of demand 
for money is a function of the capital account openness with 







>          4  
With the demand for money given by equation 2, seignorage revenue is given by  
 






        
  Seignorage =  1 µµ ⇒        5  
 
In equilibrium the growth of the money supplyµ is equal to the inflation rateπ . 
















⇒= =          6  
 
The above equation gives the optimal seignorage revenue-maximizing rate of 
inflation. Note that it depends inversely on the demand elasticity of money, which in turn 
depends directly on the extent of capital account liberalization. Thus liberalizing the 
capital account leads to lowering of the seignorage revenue maximizing rate of inflation. 
However, high inflation has several costs associated with it in terms of loss of reserves 
in a fixed exchange rate regime of depreciation of the currency in a flexible exchange 
rate.  
 








−− =+ −  
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The Central Bank would maximize this welfare function under discretion by 
choosing an optimal rate of inflation. The first order condition of the above expression is 
given as  
 
()
() () () () ()
() () 1 11 1
W ηξ ηξ 2 0
δ
πη ξ π π
δπ
−+ −+ =+ − + + −= π     7  
 
From this first order condition we want to obtain a relationship between the 
optimal inflation under discretion and the semi elasticity of demand for money. Using the 
implicit function theorem we get  
 
() ( ) [ ]
() () {}
(3 )





ππ π η π π
η ψπ ηπη
+
 ++ − +  =−
 ++ +−+ 
       8  
 
For reasonable values of the semi elasticity of demand for money  1 η >
1 we get a 
negative sign for the above derivative once we impose the restrictions  1 πη < and 
() 21 η π >+ . Thus the optimal inflation under discretion is negatively related to the semi 
elasticity of demand for money, which in turn depends positively on the extent of capital 
account liberalization. Thus an increase in capital account liberalization increases the 
semi elasticity of demand for money, which in turn decreases the welfare maximizing 
inflation under discretion. Thus we follow Bartolini and Drazen (1997) as opposed to 




  In this section we use cross-country panel data to test the prediction of the theory 
that inflation will be lower in countries that have liberalized their capital account. We look 
at a sample of 105 countries for which the capital account openness index is available 
over the period 1990-99
2. The National Accounts data are from the World Development 
Indicators of the World Bank.  
 
                                                 
1 In the standard literature the value of η  has been taken as 1.5 , 1.33 etc.  
2 Developed by Menzie Chinn and Hiro Ito (2001) 
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We also consider the log of average inflation instead of the level of inflation as a 
few countries in the sample have extremely high average inflation rates. Thus the 
parameter estimates from a linear regression would be determined almost by a handful 
of observations.  
 
 
  Table 1 summarizes the main results of the GLS estimate. The variable capital 
account openness continues to be highly significant across all specifications thereby 
implying a statistically significant negative relationship between capital account 
openness and inflation. In column 2 we add per capita GDP to the regression. This 
serves as a general measure of development and captures a variety of factors that may 
influence average inflation. The regression suggests that higher real per capita income is 
associated with a lower level of inflation. The estimated impact of capital account 
openness on inflation continues to remain unchanged.  
 
  In the next column we also include trade openness as a control variable. As 
shown in Romer (1993), opening up to trade reduces the incentive of the monetary 
authority to generate inflationary surprises. Consistent with the theory we get a negative 
and statistically significant relationship between trade openness and inflation. Column 
(II) and (III) also include a dummy variable for Latin American countries, the coefficient of 
which has not been reported in the above table. However, these coefficients confirm that 
there are significant differences between the Latin American countries and the rest of the 
world. The Latin American countries continue to be the most affected by inflation. 
 
Several other factors have been known to influence the level of inflation in a 
country. Primary among them is the level of independence that the Central Bank enjoys. 
Intuitively a less independent Central Bank is associated with a higher rate of inflation. 
Central Bank Independence refers to the obligations of the Central Bank regarding the 
financing of the budget deficit through money creation and/or interest rate manipulation. 
The freer the Central Bank is from this point of view the lower is the inflation rate. A less 
free Central Bank will be forced to introduce inflationary shocks to generate seignorage 
revenue to finance the budget deficit.  Moreover, a less free Central Bank is unable to 
pre commit to its policy choices and these results in higher inflation. Cukierman Neyapti 
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and Webb (1992) empirically show that inflation is higher in countries with lower Central 
Bank Independence.  
 
In our analysis we use the index of Central Bank Dependence developed by 
Sturm and Haan (2001). This index is based on the turnover rate of the Central Bank 
governors in more than 80 developing countries. They calculate the turnover rate rates 
for two periods: 1980-89 and 1990-98.  
 
The level of inflation is also affected by the extent of political stability that a 
country enjoys. Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1991) show that inflation will be 
higher in countries, which are politically unstable because the policy maker lacks the 
ability to pre commit.  We take the political stability index developed in Kaufmann et al 
(2002). The index has a range from –2.5 to 2.5 with higher or positive values indicating 
greater political stability.  
 
We add political stability and Central Bank dependence as our control variables 
and the results are indicated in Column V and VIII in Table 1. The theoretical prediction 
is confirmed by the signs of the coefficients on political stability and Central Bank 
dependence. While political stability is negatively related to inflation, Central Bank 
dependence shows a positive relation to inflation. However, though Central Bank 
dependence turns out to be a significant predictor of inflation the political stability is an 
insignificant. predictor of inflation.  
 
Finally in Column VI and XI we look at the interaction terms. The interaction term 
with political stability is insignificant thereby showing that political stability does not 
significantly impact the relationship between capital account openness and inflation. 
However, the interaction term with Central Bank dependence is quantitatively large and 
enters with a negative sign. Thus the negative relationship between capital account 
openness and inflation is much stronger in countries that have less independent Central 
Banks.  
 
  However as pointed out earlier the choice of imposing capital controls may be 
endogenous. Inflation levels influence the policy choice regarding the capital account. 
One generally expects countries to remove capital controls when inflation is reasonably 




under control. Thus, one would expect that any empirical results would be biased in the 
direction of finding a strong positive relationship between open capital accounts and 
reasonably low levels of inflation. To overcome this problem we use instrumental 
variables with two stage least squares.    
  
Johnson and Tamirisa (1998) investigate the empirical determinants of capital 
controls. They point out that the capital controls are motivated by (1) balance of 
payments concerns, (2) macroeconomic management, (3) the stage of the development 
of financial system and (4) prudential policy by the government to avoid financial crisis 
and (5) other reasons. Their findings suggest that countries tend to implement capital 
controls, the more prevalent the balance of payments concern are, the higher real 
interest rates and real exchanges rates and the larger the government deficit as a share 
of the GDP.  
 
Following Johnson and Tamirisa, we use reserves expressed in terms of the 
number of months of imports of goods and services which could be paid for as an 
instrument for capital account openness. We use a dummy for the Latin American 
countries to differentiate them from the rest of the world. To minimize the possibility of 
two way causality we lag the right hand side variable by one year. As a preliminary 




tt KAOPEN IR β βε − =+ +  
 
The resulting estimate of 1 β is statistically significant with theoretically predicted 
signs i.e.  1 0 β > . The results of the two stage least square regression are summarized in 
Table 2 
  
Comparing the GLS estimates with the 2SLS we find that the two-stage 
estimates tend to show a stronger impact of capital account liberalization on inflation. 
The coefficients are generally higher than the GLS coefficients and have the theoretically 
predicted negative sign. Even though the coefficients in 2SLS are less significant than 
under GLS estimation they still show that the coefficients are significant at the 1% level 
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in almost all the cases. Thus if anything, the GLS understate the importance of capital 
account opening.  
 
  Next, we divide the entire sample of countries on the basis of their level of 
indebtedness and level of per capita income. On the basis of level of indebtedness the 
overall sample can be divided into four groups, severely indebted countries (SICs), 
moderately indebted countries (MICs), low indebted countries (LICs) and other 
countries
3. In our sample of 105 countries there are 26 severely indebted countries, 27 
moderately indebted countries, 24 low indebted countries and 28 other countries. The 
last group is made up of mainly OECD countries. We run both the GLS and 2SLS 
regression on these four subsets and their results are reported in Table 3 to 10.  
 
From the GLS estimation in Table 3, 5, 7 and 9 we find that capital account 
openness continues to be a significant predictor for disinflation across all four subset of 
countries. The coefficient on capital account openness is negative and significant at the 
conventional significance level for all the four groups. However, the coefficient for the 
SICs are the highest among the four groups implying that in these countries capital 
account liberalization has the maximum impact on inflation.  
 
One explanation for this is the way the economy raises resources to repay the 
foreign debt. A country that is faced with an external debt can raise the resources to pay 
the debt either externally or internally. It can raise the resources externally in two 
different ways. Firstly it could undertake a devaluation which would make its exports 
more competitive and generate a trade surplus. Secondly it could open up the capital 
account by removing capital controls on foreign investment. This will pave the way for a 
more efficient allocation of savings and increase the country's attractiveness to foreign 
investors. In a fixed exchange rate regime this would generate foreign exchange 
reserves, which could then be used to repay the foreign debt. However, if the economy 
is closed then the government will have to raise the resources internally. This implies 
that resources will have to be transferred from the private sector to the government. If 
inflation tax is the major mechanism for this transfer then it will result in a higher inflation. 
 
3 Based on the classification in World Development Indicators 2002 
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This explains the strong negative relationship between capital account openness and 
inflation in the SICs.  
  
Even though the coefficient on capital account openness is highest for the SICs, 
it is significant for all the four groups. Thus capital account openness continues to be a 
significant predictor of disinflation across all the four groups.  
 
From these tables we can also infer that per capita GDP has a significant impact 
on inflation in the SICs and Other countries only. On the other hand trade openness has 
a significant impact on inflation only in the SICs and MICs. This conjecture is consistent 
with Terra’s (1998) argument that the negative relationship between trade openness and 
inflation exists only in the highly indebted countries that see opening up trade as a way 
to earn foreign exchange and reduce foreign debt.  
 
Finally, though political stability and Central Bank dependence do not have a 
direct effect on inflation, they do affect the way capital account openness influences 
inflation in the SICs. In this group the negative relationship between capital account 
openness and inflation is much stronger in countries that are less politically stable and 
have more dependent Central Banks.  
 
Once we take into account the endogeneity (Table 4, 6, 8 and 10) we find that 
the coefficient on capital account openness is significant across all specifications for only 
the SICs. For the MICs and LICs the coefficient is significant only under certain 
specifications, while it is not significant across all specifications for Other countries. Thus 
once we take into account the endogeneity between capital account openness and 
inflation, the former acts as a significant predictor only in the case of SICs. Thus one can 
infer that the negative relationship between capital account openness and inflation for 
the overall sample is largely driven by the response of the SICs.  
 
An alternate explanation could be the fact that it is precisely the SICs that lack 
pre commitment in their monetary policy. This would explain why the negative relation 
between capital account openness and inflation is stronger in these countries. 
 
 




Overall capital account openness acts as a significant predictor of disinflation for 
the overall sample as well as the four sub groups. Within the four subgroups it is in the 
SICs that the negative relationship is strongest. However, once we take into account the 
endogeneity between liberalizing the capital account and inflation it is only in the SICs 
that capital account openness continues to be a significant predictor of disinflation 
across all specifications. This could be either due to response of the SICs to debt crises 
and/or lack of pre commitment in their monetary policy. 
 
The spate of financial crises in Latin America and Asia in the 1990s has led many 
to question the benefits of capital account liberalization. Rodrik (1998) succinctly sums 
up the skeptics’ view: “Enshrining capital account convertibility in the IMF’s articles of 
agreement is an idea whose time has not yet come. We have no evidence it will solve 
any of our problems, and some reason to think it will make them worse.” Despite these 
warnings the 1990s saw a concerted effort towards capital account liberalization. This 
paper tries to identify one potentially important benefit of such liberalization. Capital 
account openness appears to discipline monetary authorities, or to help them convince 
the private sector that they will be more disciplined in the future.  
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Appendix A: Derivation of Some Key Equations in the Text 
 
 
Cagan Money Demand 
 
The Cagan Money Demand is given as  



































s p m          A 2  
 
 
Assume that the money is growing at a constant percentage rateµ per period.  
µ =+ t mm t
)
           A 3  
 
( µ =+ − st mm s t           A 4  
 








tt pm  





The Seignorage revenue is given as  
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The Welfare function for the Central Bank is given as  
()
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Under discretion, the Central Bank maximizes the above objective function. The first 









πη π π ψ π
δπ
−+ −+
=+ −+ + − =       A 1 0  
 
From this we need to find the relationship between inflation and the semi 
elasticity of the demand for money.  
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simplifying the above equation yields 
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Appendix B: Key Results 
Table 1: Generalized Least Squares/Random Effects for the Entire Sample 




















































































   
Political Stability times 
Openness 
      -0.032 
(0.74) 
 
   
Central Bank Dependence 
 





Central Bank Dependence 
times Openness 
 
         -0.877 
(4.26) 
 





0.314 0.328 0.348 0.368 0.371 0.212 0.243 0.258 
The t statistic is in the parentheses. A “***”, “**”,  and “*” indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level 
The regressions include a dummy variable for Latin American countries 
 
Table 2:  Two Stage Least Squares for the Entire Sample 




















































































   
Political Stability times 
Openness 
      0.160 
(1.38) 
 
   
Central Bank Dependence 
 





Central Bank Dependence 
times Openness 
 
         2.169 
(1.83) 
 





0.146 0.174 0.188 0.182 0.203 0.136 0.122 0.122 
The t statistic is in the parentheses. A “***”, “**”,  and “*” indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level 
The regressions include a dummy variable for Latin American countries 




Table 3:  Generalized Least Squares/Random Effects for Severely Indebted Countries 
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Political Stability times 
Openness 
      -0.449 
(2.59) 
 
   
Central Bank Dependence 
 





Central Bank Dependence 
times Openness 
 
         -1.631 
(3.37) 
 





0.229 0.242 0.245 0.250 0.305 0.301 0.305 0.388 
The t statistic is in the parentheses. A “***”, “**”,  and “*” indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level 
The regressions include a dummy variable for Latin American countries 
 
Table 4:  Two Stage Least Squares for Severely Indebted Countries 




















































































   
Political Stability times 
Openness 
      -1.147 
(2.20) 
 
   
Central Bank Dependence 
 





Central Bank Dependence 
times Openness 
 
         1.814 
(0.91) 
 





0.150 0.175 0.191 0.197 0.276 0.279 0.263 0.182 
The t statistic is in the parentheses. A “***”, “**”,  and “*” indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level 
The regressions include a dummy variable for Latin American countries 




Table 5:  Generalized Least Squares/Random Effects for Moderately Indebted Countries 






















       






























































   
Political Stability times 
Openness 
      -0.026 
(0.34) 
 
   
Central Bank Dependence 
 





Central Bank Dependence 
times Openness 
 
         -0.079 
(0.23) 
 





0.092 0.235 0.232 0.226 0.226 0.263 0.267 0.261 
The t statistic is in the parentheses. A “***”, “**”,  and “*” indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level 
The regressions include a dummy variable for Latin American countries 
 
Table 6:  Two Stage Least Squares for Moderately Indebted Countries 




















































































   
Political Stability times 
Openness 
      -0.804 
(0.27) 
 
   
Central Bank Dependence 
 





Central Bank Dependence 
times Openness 
 
         5.038 
(1.70) 
 





0.107 0.088 0.086 0.077 0.065 0.081 0.125 0.132 
The t statistic is in the parentheses. A “***”, “**”,  and “*” indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level 
The regressions include a dummy variable for Latin American countries 




Table 7:  Generalized Least Squares/Random Effects for Low Indebted Countries 






















       






























































   
Political Stability times 
Openness 
      -0.076 
(1.15) 
 
   
Central Bank Dependence 
 





Central Bank Dependence 
times Openness 
 
         0.149 
(0.62) 
 





0.360 0.231 0.174 0.173 0.174 0.231 0.229 0.225 
The t statistic is in the parentheses. A “***”, “**”,  and “*” indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level 
The regressions include a dummy variable for Latin American countries 
 
Table 8:  Two Stage Least Squares for Low Indebted Countries 




















































































   
Political Stability times 
Openness 
      -0.144 
(1.53) 
 
   
Central Bank Dependence 
 





Central Bank Dependence 
times Openness 
 
         2.805 
(1.29) 
 





0.010 0.156 0.161 0.173 0.147 0.156 0.184 0.129 
The t statistic is in the parentheses. A “***”, “**”,  and “*” indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level 
The regressions include a dummy variable for Latin American countries 




Table 9:  Generalized Least Squares/Random Effects for Other Countries 




























































Political Stability times 
Openness 
      -0.099 
(0.92) 
 
Central Bank Dependence 
 
      
Central Bank Dependence 
times Openness 
 
      




0.285 0.475 0.405 0.436 0.436 




Table 10:  Two Stage Least Squares for Other Indebted Countries 




























































Political Stability times 
Openness 
       -1.167 
(1.09) 
 
Central Bank Dependence 
 
       
Central Bank Dependence 
times Openness 
 
       




0.021 0.287 0.250 0.382 0.128 
The t statistic is in the parentheses. A “***”, “**”,  and “*” indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level 
 
    




Appendix C: Classification of Countries According to Debt Level 
Severely Indebted  Moderately Indebted  Low Indebted  Others 
Argentina Algeria  Bahrain  Australia 
Benin Belize  Bangladesh  Austria 
Brazil Bolivia  Botswana  Bahamas,  The 
Burundi  Burkina Faso  Costa Rica  Barbados 
Cameroon Chile  Dominican  Republic  Belgium 
Central African Republic  Colombia  Egypt, Arab Rep.  Canada 
Chad  Gambia, The  El Salvador  Cyprus 
Congo, Rep.  Ghana Fiji  Denmark 
Cote d'Ivoire  Haiti  Guatemala  Finland 
Ecuador Honduras  India  France 
Gabon  Jamaica  Iran, Islamic Rep.  Greece 
Indonesia Kenya  Korea,  Rep.  Iceland 
Jordan Malaysia Lesotho  Ireland 
Madagascar Mali  Mexico  Israel 
Malawi Mauritius Morocco  Italy 
Mauritania Panama  Nepal  Japan 
Nicaragua Papua  New  Guinea  Oman  Kuwait 
Niger Philippines  Paraguay  Malta 
Nigeria Senegal  Saudi  Arabia  Netherlands 
Pakistan Thailand  Seychelles  New  Zealand 
Peru Togo  South  Africa  Norway 
Rwanda Tunisia  Sri  Lanka  Portugal 
Sierra Leone  Turkey  Swaziland  Singapore 
Syrian Arab Republic  Uganda  Trinidad and Tobago  Spain 
Tanzania Uruguay    Sweden 
Zambia Venezuela,  RB    Switzerland 
 Zimbabwe    United  Kingdom 
     United  States 
 